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Abstract 
Ethnic minorities fare less well on average in the labour market than their white British counterparts. 
Experimental research shows that employers discriminate against ethnic minority applicants while 
hiring, but it is impossible to say from these studies how much of minorities’ overall disadvantage – 
which reflects compositional differences and search behaviour as well as hiring – is due to 
discrimination. This paper connects results from two UK-based field experiments with ethnic penalties 
estimated from comparable samples of the UK Labour Force Survey and Understanding Society to 
show the relation between hiring discrimination and labour market penalties, for several ethnic 
minority groups. Higher hiring discrimination is indeed associated with worse ethnic employment 
penalties, but similarly discriminated against groups do not necessarily face the same ethnic penalties. 
We provide a discussion of possible reasons for this variation. Our research points to socio-economic 
resources and supply-side differences among ethnic groups as plausible explanations.  
Keywords: ethnic penalty, ethnic discrimination, labour market, correspondence test, employers 
Introduction 
Ethnic minorities are generally less likely to be employed or to have good jobs than the majority group, 
even after accounting for socio-economic differences (van Tubergen, Maas and Flap, 2004; Heath, 
Rothon and Kilpi, 2008). It is crucial to know to what extent these net gaps (often referred to as ‘ethnic 
penalties’) reflect differences between ethnic minorities and the majority in terms of their 
characteristics, resources and labour market behaviour; or if they reflect discrimination where 
employers are less likely to hire an ethnic minority applicant than an identical majority applicant. The 
literature has generally focused either on estimating average ethnic penalties (i.e. the net gaps in 
outcomes remaining after controlling for demographics, human capital, social capital and other 
relevant characteristics) using statistical analyses of secondary data (Heath and McMahon, 1997; 
Berthoud, 2000; Carmichael and Woods, 2000); or on showing the presence of ethnic discrimination 
in hiring through field experimental methods targeting employers’ decision-making (see e.g. Neumark, 
2018; Quillian et al., 2017; Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016).  There has however been little or no research 
exploring the relationship between the findings from these two different approaches. 
This paper connects the two approaches to answer the following important question: “is hiring 
discrimination related to the relatively worse employment outcomes for ethnic minorities in the UK?”.  
More specifically, do minorities whose net outcomes (that is, ethnic penalties) are worse also 
experience higher rates of discrimination, while those whose net outcomes are closer to those of the 
majority experience lower rates of discrimination?  We estimate ethnic penalties from the Labour 
Force Survey – a large representative survey; and compare these penalties with estimates of the hiring 
discrimination faced by ethnic minorities in the UK obtained from two field experiments. We take as 
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a starting point in this comparison the observation that the net labour market outcomes of ethnic 
minorities, captured by ethnic penalties, depend both on supply-side factors – differences in 
minorities’ search strategy and (un)observed characteristics – and on demand-side factors – hiring 
decisions of employers.  Field experiments, however, address exclusively the demand side. Hence, it 
is necessary and important to combine evidence from both perspectives. Already a decade ago, Pager 
(2007: 120) suggested, as one promising avenue for further research on discrimination, that future 
studies “should make efforts to empirically map the findings from audit studies [the term she uses to 
refer to field experiments] onto population surveys of job search and employment patterns.” We take 
up this challenge in the current study.  
The next section defines key concepts and explains the conceptual framework in more detail. We then 
discuss the data used in this study and show the relation between hiring discrimination and ethnic 
penalties. We find that ethnic penalties in employment are indeed larger for more discriminated 
against groups, but similarly discriminated against groups do not necessarily incur similar ethnic 
penalties. While we cannot in this paper identify the mechanisms through which some minority groups 
obtain better labour market outcomes than others facing similar rates of hiring discrimination, we 
consider several options. Group-differences in the process of looking for work, particularly by 
activating social networks and community resources, seem a likely explanation of why certain groups 
manage to bypass discrimination by employers.  
Conceptual framework 
Ethnic discrimination in hiring (hiring discrimination) and ethnic penalties on the labour market are 
generally measured through different methods. On the one hand, the ethnic penalties literature has 
established from statistical analysis of survey data that many ethnic minority groups in the UK have, 
on average, a lower probability of being employed and work on lower quality jobs than the white 
British majority possessing the same qualifications (Heath and McMahon, 1997; Berthoud, 2000; 
Carmichael and Woods, 2000). The discrimination literature on the other hand has established from 
field experiments that ethnic minority applicants in the UK are, ceteris paribus, less likely to receive a 
positive reply to their application than the white British majority (Wood et al., 2009; Heath and Di 
Stasio, 2019). While discrimination is often assumed to cause these ethnic penalties, it is not possible 
to show this without connecting these two strands of research. Figure 1 presents the conceptual link 
between hiring discrimination and ethnic penalties. Our starting point, then, is that hiring 
discrimination – estimated through field experiments – is likely to represent one crucial component 
of the overall ethnic penalties generally found, although not necessarily the only component. 
[Figure 1 here] 
First (A), Hiring discrimination is the extent to which ethnic minorities are less likely to proceed in the 
hiring process than majority members with identical credentials and C.V.. The extent of hiring 
discrimination is generally measured through field experiments. Field experiments come in two forms 
– audit studies and correspondence tests – both relying on matched pairs or sets of fictitious 
applicants which are identical except for the characteristics (such as ethnicity) that allegedly cause 
discrimination, with audit studies using in-person applications and correspondence tests relying on 
written applications. These matched applicants respond to real vacancies in random order. Ethnicity 
is typically signalled by the foreign-sounding names of the applicants, their reported mother tongue, 
or pictures in settings where this is commonly included. Discrimination is then measured as the 
average difference in the responses that majority and minority applicants receive to their applications. 
The principal strength of audit and correspondence tests is that they employ the key experimental 
feature of random assignment to treatment while taking place in real labour market contexts (Pager, 
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2007; Pager and Shepherd, 2008). For this reason, they are considered the gold standard for 
discrimination research, although they do have some limitationsi. 
British experiments establish that ethnic minority applications suffer discriminatory decisions by 
employers at point of hire: keeping all else constant, members of ethnic minority groups are less likely 
to receive a positive response than majority applicants when applying for a job (Heath and Cheung, 
2006; Wood et al., 2009; Bagley and Abubaker, 2017; Heath and Di Stasio, 2019)Discrimination does 
not, however, affect all minorities to the same degree: white minorities are generally treated more 
favourably than visible minorities, e.g. South-Asian or black minorities, while little difference is found 
between these latter two groups. These risks of discrimination are persistent. A comparison of field 
experiments over time shows no downward trend in discrimination in the UK (Heath and Di Stasio, 
2019) or the US (Quillian et al., 2017).  
Second (B), Ethnic penalties refer to the net differences in labour market outcomes of ethnic 
minorities compared to the majority after controlling for observed characteristics. A large body of 
literature established ethnic penalties in the UK in employment and occupational status (Blackaby et 
al., 2005; Cheung, 2013; Dustmann and Theodoropoulos, 2010). As opposed to the consistent and 
relatively undifferentiated presence of hiring discrimination, there is more variation in the size of the 
ethnic penalties between groups and over time. White minorities generally do as well as or even better 
than the UK majority; and Indian and Chinese minorities generally outperform Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
minorities (Li and Heath, 2008). Li and Heath (2008) show a reduction in ethnic penalties over time for 
some groups – notably Indian, and to some extent black Caribbean men, in the UK, which contrasts 
with the lack of improvement in discrimination as evidenced from field experiments (Heath and Di 
Stasio, 2019).  
Ethnic penalties may result from hiring discrimination but ascertaining this would require controlling 
for all compositional and behavioural differences between ethnic groups on the supply-side – 
including any unobserved differences in, for example, job search behaviour. In previous studies, after 
controlling for possible compositional differences – such as differences in qualifications (Zwysen and 
Longhi, 2018), language skills (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003) and social class background (Zuccotti, 
2015) – the difference between minorities and the majority is reduced, but substantial unexplained 
gaps remain. An exception is the work by Koopmans (2016) showing that ethnic penalties in labour 
force participation (a different outcome from that usually studied in the ethnic penalties literature) 
for Muslim women disappeared when accounting for “socio-cultural values” including language skills, 
networks and liberal gender values. As it is impossible, using survey data, to rule out the possibility 
that additional but unobserved factors may explain ethnic penalties these studies cannot demonstrate 
that discrimination causes the ethnic penalties.   
Third (C), strategic behaviour can shape the impact of hiring discrimination on ethnic penalties. Field 
experiments, by design, keep not only individual characteristics but also job search behaviour 
constant, since the fictitious applicants by design apply for the same jobs (or type of job). They 
therefore do not account for ethnic differences in job search. This strategic behaviour can take several 
forms: knowing how to present yourself to the employer (Hiemstra et al., 2013); changing the amount 
and quality of jobs applied to (Pager and Pedulla, 2015); or avoiding discrimination by becoming self-
employed, relying more on the public sector (where discrimination appears to be lower) and searching 
through social networks rather than more formal methods (Battu, Seaman and Zenou, 2011; Modood 
and Khattab, 2016). If these strategies differ between groups, different ethnic penalties may arise for 
ethnic minority groups who face similar risks of discrimination as those groups who search more 
strategically may be able to bypass discrimination to some extent.  
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In this paper we compare the hiring discrimination results from field experiments, which can be seen 
as counterfactual estimates of the disadvantage on the labour market that would occur if all 
compositional differences (both observed and unobserved) and labour market behaviour were kept 
constant (the B and C paths in figure 1), with the actual labour market disadvantage of a comparable 
representative group as obtained through statistical analyses of secondary data (ethnic penalty). As 
surveys cannot account for all possible differences in composition and strategic behaviour, the 
difference between the estimates from field experiment and those from surveys indicates the role 
played by any differences in composition or strategic behaviour, or both.  
 
Data and Methodological Approach 
Measuring Discrimination from Experimental data 
We make use of two field experiments on ethnic discrimination carried out in the UKii: one funded by 
the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) in 2008 and 2009 and published by NatCen (Wood et 
al., 2009), and the other funded by Horizon2020 and conducted in 2016 and 2017 in five European 
countries including the UK (Lancee et al., 2019).  
Wood and co-authors (2009) sent fictitious competitive applications to open vacancies in large diverse 
cities. The experiment covered nine different occupations: IT support, accounts clerk, sales assistant, 
office assistant, care assistant, IT technician, accountant, HR manager, and teaching assistant. Three 
applications – two from a randomly varied ethnic minority group and one from the majority, keeping 
gender constant – were sent to each of 987 vacancies between November 2008 and May 2009. They 
signalled ethnicity through names typical of white British, Pakistani and Bangladeshi; black African; 
black Caribbean; Indian; and Chinese adults. Discrimination was measured as the difference in the 
proportion of positive responses received by majority and minority groups. The C.V.s that were sent 
out all related to relatively young applicants (between 20 and 35), with some work experience (ranging 
from two years to around 15), who had British nationality and had at least GCSE qualifications. A 
positive response was defined as being called back for an interview or other form of positive response 
(eg request for information about wage expectations).  
The second set of field experimental data was gathered in England between 2016 and 2017 as part of 
the GEMM (Growth, Equal Opportunities, Migration and Markets) project. Unlike the DWP field 
experiments, only one application was sent to each employeriii/iv. Applicants varied by their ethnicity 
as well as by other randomly varying characteristics. Vacancies were sampled from an online job portal 
and covered six occupations – cook, store assistant, receptionist, payroll clerk, sales representative 
and software developer – which vary by skill level and required customer contact. Ethnicity was 
signalled by the name of the applicant as well as by mother tongue.  A sentence in the cover letter 
reiterated the ethnic background of the applicant and explained that all relevant qualifications and 
training had been obtained in the UK. In view of its comparative design, the GEMM field experiment 
included a larger number of minority groups than is usual in single country studies but also 
oversampled two groups of special interest in the UK. Overall, the GEMM design included 25% of 
applications from majority members, 25% from applicants with Nigerian and Pakistani origins (in 
roughly equal proportion) and 50% of applications from 33 other minority groups.  We grouped the 
origin countries into eight regional groups: white British, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, Black African 
(Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda and Somalia), Eastern European (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, 
Romania, Russia), Western European and the US (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
US, Ireland, abbreviated to West), Middle Eastern and North African (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Turkey, abbreviated to MENA), remaining Asian countries (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
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South Korea, Vietnam), Caribbean and South American (Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica). 
Applicants were either born in the UK or arrived when they were younger than six; they also had 
around four years of work experience. A positive response was defined as receiving an invitation to 
(pre-)interview or a request for more information, and a negative response as a rejection or no 
responsev. 
Measuring Ethnic Penalties from Secondary Data 
We compare the odds ratios of being an employee or self-employed rather than unemployed – 
estimated from surveys – to the odds ratios of receiving a positive call-back in the two hiring 
discrimination experiments.  For both analyses white British constitute the reference category. 
Economically inactive respondents are excluded from the survey data in order to limit differences due 
to self-selection into work. We use the UK Labour Force Survey data (UKLFS), a quarterly 
representative sample of the UK population, to estimate ethnic penalties through a logistic regression 
of the probability of being employed.   
In order to obtain sufficiently large samples, we pool UKLFS quarters from 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 
to create a comparison set for the 2008/9 DWP experiments. UKLFS data are pooled from 2014 
through to the 2nd quarter of 2017 to estimate ethnic penalties comparable to the 2016/7 GEMM 
experiments. We use country of birth and nationality as well as self-reported ethnicity to create ethnic 
groups which are comparable in the survey and field experiment datavi. 
The independent variable of interest is a set of ethnic dummies which capture ethnic penalties. The 
model controls for: time since leaving full-time education, age and age squared, highest obtained 
qualifications, having UK citizenship, whether respondents are cohabiting with a partner, and whether 
a dependent child is present in the household, as well as fixed effects for region and year of survey. 
Table 1a and Table 1b show descriptive statistics for the two datasets. Appendix B in the 
supplementary material presents the results from these regressions. 
[Table 1a here] 
[Table 1b here] 
Findings 
Gaps by ethnic groups 
Figure 2 shows the estimated discrimination in the GEMM and DWP experiments and the 
corresponding ethnic penalties estimated from the UKLFS. Odds ratios below 1 indicate that the 
probability of a positive response from the employer (ethnic discrimination) or the probability of being 
employed (ethnic penalty) is below that of the white British.  
A first clear observation from the earlier DWP experiment (left panel) is that, as reported by Wood et 
al. (2009), all ethnic minority groups are substantiallyvii less likely than the white British to receive a 
positive call-back when applying for a job. However, while there are no discernible differences in hiring 
discrimination between the groups, the ethnic penalties do differ substantially (consistent with the 
previous literature). Most notably, Chinese and Indian minorities fare better than black African, black 
Caribbean and Pakistani/Bangladeshi minorities with respect to ethnic penalties, despite their very 
similar risks of hiring discrimination.  
[Figure 2 here]  
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The second panel of figure 2 shows the estimated discrimination from the GEMM experiment and the 
corresponding ethnic penalties. Apart from white Western minorities,viii all other groups are less likely 
to receive a call-back than the white British. The GEMM data indicates worst discrimination for black 
African, black Caribbean, and Pakistani and Bangladeshi applicants, followed by Asian and Eastern 
European applicants, and no discrimination against Western minorities. In comparison, ethnic 
penalties in employment are smallest for Eastern European, who are even more likely to be employed 
than the majority group, and Western applicants, followed by Asian and black Caribbean minorities, 
while minorities from the Middle East and North Africa, other African countries, and 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi minorities do worst.  
In both field experiments non-white minorities have lower call-back rates than white British, 
regardless of their ethnic group. In the GEMM experiment white Western minorities stand out as the 
only minority group not being discriminated against, while white Eastern European minorities do face 
discrimination. Ethnic penalties vary more between non-white groups, however, with Indian, Chinese 
and other Asian minorities having better labour market outcomes (lower ethnic penalties) than other 
minority groups who face similar levels of hiring discrimination in the field experiments. Black African 
minorities stand out as doing worst both in terms of discrimination and ethnic penalties. 
Gaps by occupation  
The second analysis compares ethnic penalties – averaged over all minority groups – at different skill 
levels. Both the DWP and GEMM experiments included occupations for which applicants typically have 
lower, middle and higher qualifications. Table 2 compares the occupational differences in hiring 
discrimination with the ethnic penalty with respect to employment at that occupational level (as 
opposed to working in a lower quality job or being unemployedix).  We estimate the ethnic penalties 
for subsamples having similar levels of skills as those involved in the field experimentsx and, in the 
case of the DWP experiments, similar potential labour market experience. The odds ratios are 
averaged over ethnic groupsxi.  As before, the lower the estimate, the greater are the risks of 
discrimination and the magnitude of the ethnic penalties. 
The GEMM experiment shows substantial discrimination of similar magnitude at all occupational 
levels. In the case of the DWP experiments the discrimination rates are all very imprecisely estimated, 
but the point estimates also suggest relatively strong discrimination at all occupational levels. In 
contrast, ethnic penalties are substantially lower among the higher skilled than the lower skilled 
subsamples.  This suggests that, despite the consistently high discrimination they face, minorities are 
not much less likely to obtain good jobs than the majority when they are highly educated. Ethnic 
penalties remain substantial among the lower qualified, but they also seem to be relatively small 
compared to the estimated hiring discrimination. There may be more options for very low-status 
employment at this level. The middling groups, however, struggle to find jobs that match their 
qualifications. 
[Table 2 here] 
Patterns of discrimination and penalties: a discussion 
Figure 3 compares the ethnic penalties estimated in the usual way from the LFS data with hypothetical 
ethnic penalties based on the rates of discrimination found in the field experiments. Instead of ethnic 
dummies the model includes the hiring discrimination rate specific to each group as estimated in the 
field experiments. The counterfactual ethnic penalty is then the predicted employment penalty 
compared to the white British majority for minority respondents experiencing the group-specific 
discrimination rate (all other controls being included).  
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Comparing the two sets of estimates points to three clusters of minorities. First, a cluster of minorities 
with high employment penalties that match their relatively severe hiring discrimination: Black African, 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Middle Eastern and North African, and black Caribbean. Second, a cluster of 
minorities facing low employment penalties in line with lower hiring discrimination: White Western 
minorities, and Asian minorities in the GEMM results. Third, minorities with lower employment 
penalties than would be expected given their substantial hiring discrimination rates: Chinese and 
Indian minorities in the DWP results, and Eastern European minorities in GEMM.  
[Figure 3 here] 
These differences in ethnic penalties  at different levels of discrimination point to the need to focus 
on the different potential mechanisms operating on the supply side (Modood and Khattab, 2016). In 
this section we discuss two broad possible mechanisms which could generate the differences shown 
in figure 3: selectivity and strategic behaviour.  
First, differences between ethnic groups in their resilience to hiring discrimination may reflect 
remaining unobserved characteristics resulting for example from the initial selectivity of these groups. 
The children of more positively selected migrant groups benefit from higher aspirations, more 
parental support and resources, and a stronger community network (Ichou, 2014; van de Werfhorst 
and Heath, 2019). In their comparative study on the selectivity of migration by ethnic groups, van de 
Werfhorst and Heath (2019) show black African migrants to be most positively selected in terms of 
their education compared to non-migrants, followed by Chinese and Indian migrants. Pakistani are 
weakly positively selected, while black Caribbean and Bangladeshi migrants are weakly negatively 
selected compared to stayers. The initially strong positive selection of Indian and Chinese migrants 
might explain some of the resilience of these communities, but this explanation falls short of 
explaining the worse outcomes for black Africans.  
Second, minorities may react to (perceived) discrimination on the labour market by avoiding 
discriminatory employers. One option to do this is through a higher reliance on self-employment 
(Light, 2005; Modood and Khattab 2016). A recent study does indicate that self-employment is more 
often due to economic necessity for ethnic minorities than for white British (Brynin, Karim and Zwysen, 
2019). Based on the UKLFS sample (tables 1a and 1b) self-employment is highest among 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Eastern European and North African and Middle Eastern minorities; and in 
2007-2010 also for Chinese and to some extent Indian minorities. A higher rate of self-employment 
may therefore play a limited role in overcoming disadvantage but does not explain differences 
between groups and the enduring disadvantage of Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities well enough.  
The public sector is sometimes put forward as a fairer employer where discrimination would play less 
of a role (Wood et al., 2009), although recent research in Denmark suggests this may not be true 
(Villadsen and Wulff, 2018).  In the UKLFS sample only black Africans and black Caribbeans are more 
likely than the white British to work in the public sector, while South- and East-Asian workers and East-
European workers do not have high probabilities of working in the public sector, indicating it is unlikely 
that strategic employment in the public sector explains the relatively favourable outcomes (relative 
to those expected) observed for Indian, Chinese and East European minorities in Figure 3.  
Another strategy to avoid discriminatory employers is to cast a wider net and apply to any job, 
including jobs below one’s skill levels (Pager and Pedulla, 2015). This would reduce the employment 
gap while resulting in minorities working in lower quality jobs compared to similar white British. We 
therefore compare the ethnic penalties in employment with the ethnic penalties in occupational 
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status, measured as ISEI (Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman, 1992), conditional on being employed. 
Results are available in tables A2a and A2b in the online appendix (A). The groups with high 
employment penalties also face substantial ethnic gaps in occupational status, while the occupational 
status gaps are positive for Indian and Chinese workers (2007-2010) and Western minorities (2014-
2017). The ethnic penalties in occupational status are very high for Eastern European minorities (2014-
2017) however. Combined with the earlier finding of an ethnic premium in employment for Eastern 
Europeans, this analysis suggests that this group may achieve high employment at the cost of working 
in lower quality jobs (Johnston, Khattab and Manley, 2015). 
Minorities may search for jobs through their social networks rather than other methods when faced 
with high (perceived) discrimination. Several studies do indeed find that ethnic minorities in the UK 
are more likely to search for work through social networks than the majority group (Battu, Seaman 
and Zenou, 2011; Giulietti, Schluter and Wahba, 2013). Chinese, Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi job 
seekers in the 2007-2010 UKLFS rely more on social networks than the white British majority or black 
Africans and black Caribbeans, although their higher search through networks does not always result 
in a higher rate of jobs found through networks. In the 2014-2017 UKLFS the use of networks in job 
search is highest for Eastern Europeans, North African and Middle Eastern minorities, 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi and Asian minorities.  
Network use alone does not therefore fully explain the combination of patterns shown in figure 3. 
However, social networks may be a successful strategy only for the more resourceful communities 
who can provide support in finding good jobs– such as Chinese, Indian, or ‘other white’ minorities – 
while more disadvantaged groups such as Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities would not have access 
to similar resources and support within their ethnic networks (Zhou, 2005). Previous studies showed 
that the effectiveness of minorities’ social networks depend on the resources available within often 
ethnically segregated communities (Patacchini and Zenou, 2012; Dustmann, Glitz and Schonberg, 
2016). If groups facing high discrimination have to rely more on their social networks for finding good 
employment, socio-economic differences at the group level – which reflect the resources and type of 
information available within the ethnic network – will carry over through time and replicate 
differences between groups. This reasoning is consistent with results from a recent study conducted 
in the US, showing that white and black job seekers have similar access to networks, but differential 
returns due to the lower likelihood that blacks’ contacts mobilize key resources leading to job 
placement (Pedulla and Pager, 2019). A similar mechanism may be driving our results. The groups that 
do relatively better than expected are also the groups with generally better educational outcomes and 
socio-economic resources (Modood, 2005), in combination with higher reliance on social networks in 
the job search.  
Descriptively then, the patterns shown in figure 3 cannot be fully explained by only looking at 
differences in selectivity, or differential job search strategy. The combination of high reliance on social 
networks for some minority groups, such as Chinese, Indian, and Eastern European, combined with 
high resources within the own community, may however explain their relatively better-than-expected 
labour market outcomes. However, this is a tentative conclusion that needs to be empirically tested 
in future studies. 
Robustness tests 
We test the robustness of these results using four different specifications. First, we restrict the sample 
in the LFS to reflect the experimental C.V.s more closely in terms of age, nationality, qualifications and 
work experience. Second, we re-estimate the ethnic penalties using the UK Household Longitudinal 
Study (UKHLS) instead of the LFS. Neither of these tests changes the hierarchy of ethnic penalties. 
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Third, we test whether group differences in cultural values or norms as well as language skills can 
function as drivers of ethnic penalties as well as driving hiring discrimination. Including these concepts 
does not change the ethnic penalties in a meaningful way. Finally, we split up the analyses by gender. 
Results are generally consistent, but ethnic discrimination seems overall worse for Asian women than 
men. These tests and their results are presented in full in appendix C in the supplementary material.   
Conclusion 
We argue that to understand the occurrence of ethnic disadvantage in the labour market, data on 
hiring discrimination obtained from field experiments must be connected to observed labour market 
outcomes. Using data from recent experimental studies on labour market discrimination in the UK 
together with representative data from the UK Labour Force Survey for comparable groups, we show 
a sizeable positive relation between the degree of ethnic discrimination recorded in field experiments 
and the overall disadvantage faced by ethnic minorities on the labour market. This strongly suggests 
that ethnic penalties reflect hiring discrimination, and generally groups that experience worse hiring 
discrimination also have higher ethnic penalties in employment. 
The extent of congruence between ethnic discrimination and labour market outcomes varies strongly 
between groups, however. The congruence is greatest among Black African, African and Middle 
Eastern and Pakistani/Bangladeshi minorities, who are most consistently discriminated against and 
who also experience substantial employment gaps. At the other end, Western-origin minorities face 
little discrimination and little ethnic disadvantage. In contrast, the congruence is weaker among Indian 
and Chinese minorities who are discriminated against but do not experience ethnic penalties as high 
as would be expected based on the level of discrimination recorded in field experiments. We also find 
that the more highly qualified, while still discriminated against, are more resistant to this disadvantage 
and able to find appropriate work, while those with middle and lower qualifications face more 
struggles in finding appropriate jobs.  
We discuss possible reasons that may account for these differences. While we do not test these 
explanations directly, we propose that some of the better-performing ethnic groups might have access 
to more resourceful social networks that can help in finding jobs through other channels than 
responding directly to vacancies. 
While this paper provides a start, future work must connect the growing number of field experimental 
studies on discrimination to labour market outcomes as observed in corresponding populations. By 
gathering more data on why discrimination results in large ethnic penalties for some groups and fewer 
for others it may be possible to find ways to combat discrimination more effectively. Shifting attention 
to the strategic search behaviour of ethnic minorities would also mean recognizing that these groups 
have agency and that their labour market success is not unilaterally determined by employers’ 
discretion. Future research therefore likely requires more detailed data on the job search process and 
on the resources of the ethnic community in the face of perceived or anticipated discrimination.
i Correspondence tests provide causal and intuitive estimates of discrimination. However, the required ceteris paribus 
condition – where applications are constructed to be comparable and of a high enough quality as to ensure call-backs from 
employers –likely does not reflect reality. Holding all characteristics of applicants constant may overstate discrimination as 
ethnicity becomes the only differentiating factor in the applicant pair and can be used to “break a tie” (Heckman and 
Siegelman, 1993; Pager, 2007, p. 116). Correspondence tests can also only examine the behaviour of employers at the first 
stage of the hiring process, typically the invitation to a job interview. Receiving as many interview invitations as the majority 
applicant need not be a guarantee of equal treatment: for example, Pager at al. (2009) report many instances of downward 
job channelling at the interview stage, with employers encouraging applicants to consider jobs at a lower level than originally 
advertised.  
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ii Experimental results were mainly gathered in England. The GEMM study only targets vacancies in England; and the DWP 
study includes Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Leeds, London, Manchester and Glasgow. 
iii The GEMM study uses an unpaired design where employers receive only one job application containing a randomly 
chosen set of characteristics. Through proper randomization, unpaired designs provide unbiased estimates of 
discrimination while also minimizing the risk of detection compared to paired designs as shown by Weichselbaumer (2015). 
iv Correspondence tests violate the principles of voluntary and informed consent of research participants. By design, they 
rely on deception (Riach and Rich, 2002; Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016). While planning and conducting the study, we were 
committed to minimizing the burden on participants, preventing any harm and protecting their confidentiality. We 
obtained IRB approval from the ethics committee of our institution before starting fieldwork. The unpaired design of the 
GEMM study, with only one application sent in response to each job opening, minimized the inconvenience to employers. 
Following best practices in the correspondence testing literature (Pager 2007; Zschirnt 2019), we opted for a collective 
debriefing of participants, to avoid the risk that individual debriefing of participants may expose them to 
greater scrutiny by superiors or generate negative emotions, such as embarrassment or shame. To protect employers' 
confidentiality, anonymity was guaranteed. The unpaired design of the GEMM study also implies that participating 
employers cannot be singled out as discriminatory, as discrimination can only be detected at the aggregate level and not at 
the firm level. 
 
v The GEMM discrimination rates are the difference in receiving any response, including requests for more information. As 
a robustness test we compare these discrimination rates to a stricter version where only an invitation to (pre-) interview is 
taken as a positive response. The results, shown in table A1 in appendix A, are similar albeit less precisely estimated when 
using the invitation to interview. 
vi Where nationality is missing we relied on self-reported ethnicity: white British, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and black African 
ethnicities are added to their relevant groups; those reporting as white Irish are added to the Western group; Indian, 
Chinese, and other Asian are grouped under other Asian; and those self-reporting as black Caribbean are added to the 
Caribbean and South American group.  
vii The results are also statistically significant (p<0.05). A p-value indicates the probability that a result of the reported 
magnitude or higher (in absolute terms) is found if there were in truth no effect (the population parameter is 0). A p-value 
below 0.05 then means the probability of us finding such a difference between ethnic minorities and the majority if there 
was no difference in reality is less than 1 in 20. Crucially, these values also depend on the assumptions of the model being 
correct. As p-values can be seen to be somewhat arbitrary their use is increasingly being criticized. We opt to show the 
statistical significance, as well as the confidence intervals (which are a function of the standard error of the statistic) where 
useful in order to show the certainty of our estimates and to increase the ease of comparing it to other studies using p-
values.  
viii In the GEMM experiments skin colour was not varied as no pictures were included in the UK. We therefore assume that 
employers perceive applicants from the majority, as well as those from the US and Europe, as white.  
ix The outcome is having a job of at least the same status (as measured by the ISEI score) as the target job in the field 
experiments, rather than having a lower-status job or being unemployed. In the DWP experiment, IT support and IT 
technician were assigned ISEI 61, accounts clerk 51, sales assistant 28.5, office assistant 42.30, care assistant 22, 
accountant 69, HR manager 69, and teaching assistant 25; and in the GEMM experiments cooks have an ISEI of 24.5, store 
assistants 28.5, payroll clerks 50.4, receptionist 39, software developers 74.7 and sales representatives 73.9. 
x The ethnic penalties for each occupation were estimated for a group having a comparable level of education to the 
fictitious applicants: the lowest qualified having GCSEs, the middle groups having A-levels or equivalent qualifications and 
the highest-qualified being university graduates. In the DWP experiment there was variation in experience as well. Among 
the middle skilled we differentiate between home care assistants, IT support, office support and teaching assistant (higher 
secondary qualifications, no tertiary degree, less than 6 years of potential experience) on the one hand and accounts clerks 
and IT technicians (higher secondary, no tertiary degree, more than 6 years of potential experience) on the other. The 
highly qualified have at least six years potential experience. 
xi The common odds ratio is obtained by averaging the log odds ratios of each ethnic penalty relative to the white British. 
This is done to abstract from the differences in group sizes of each ethnic group in the field experiments and the LFS. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1a: Averages of main variables by ethnicity for the UKLFS 2007-2010 sample 
UKLFS, 2007-2010 
white 
British 
Black 
African 
Black 
Caribbean Chinese Indian 
Pakistani 
/Bangladeshi 
Employed 0.94 0.86 0.86 0.93 0.92 0.85 
Occupational status 45.52 42.60 42.49 49.03 49.93 42.88 
female 0.48 0.49 0.56 0.54 0.44 0.31 
UK citizen 0.97 0.48 0.87 0.54 0.72 0.80 
Cohabiting 0.67 0.54 0.40 0.64 0.71 0.65 
Dependent child 0.36 0.55 0.42 0.31 0.44 0.62 
Age 41.73 37.61 40.12 37.72 37.97 34.06 
Potential experience 19.01 11.33 15.66 14.05 15.39 12.85 
Self-employed 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.22 
Public sector 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.20 0.24 0.17 
Primary qualifications 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.26 
Lower secondary 
qualifications 0.28 0.15 0.30 0.07 0.13 0.25 
Upper secondary 
qualifications 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.19 0.19 
Higher qualifications 0.25 0.36 0.22 0.55 0.41 0.30 
Found job through networks 0.30 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.32 
Search jobs through networks 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.12 
Observations 731613 9033 7921 3555 17347 11530 
 
Table 1b: Averages of main variables by ethnicity for the UKLFS 2014-2017 sample 
 
 
 
UKLFS 2014-2017 
White 
British 
Pakistani/ 
Bangladeshi 
Black 
African 
Eastern 
Europe West 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa Asian 
Black 
Caribbean 
Employed 0.95 0.88 0.87 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.94 0.90 
Occupational 
status 47.67 43.41 43.12 36.35 53.08 46.78 49.36 44.89 
female 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.46 0.53 0.57 
UK citizen 0.95 0.86 0.70 0.07 0.24 0.50 0.68 0.86 
Cohabiting 0.52 0.40 0.29 0.58 0.54 0.61 0.52 0.31 
Dependent child 0.42 0.75 0.73 0.57 0.46 0.51 0.57 0.47 
Age 40.45 26.75 27.09 30.16 38.79 40.51 33.63 38.38 
Potential 
experience 22.68 15.17 11.21 11.52 17.81 17.72 16.46 18.13 
Self-employed 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.11 
Public sector 0.23 0.17 0.28 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.28 
Low qualifications 0.42 0.53 0.37 0.47 0.30 0.45 0.36 0.43 
Middle 
qualifications 0.33 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.32 
High qualifications 0.26 0.26 0.36 0.35 0.46 0.38 0.44 0.25 
Found job through 
networks 0.28 0.30 0.22 0.35 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.19 
Search jobs 
through networks 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.06 
Observations 940,344 31,951 20,090 16,144 34,795 5,444 51,988 12,016 
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Table 2: Odds ratios of discrimination at different occupational levels and average ethnic penalties 
with respect to jobs at comparable level s  
 DWP experiment and UKLFS (2007-2010) GEMM experiment and UKLFS (2014-2017) 
Skills Occupation Experiment 
Ethnic 
penalty Occupation Experiment 
Ethnic 
penalty 
Low Sales assistant 0.458NS 0.755 Cook 0.379 0.678 
    Store assistant 0.658 0.655 
Middle Office assistant 0.135 0.874 Payroll clerk 0.490 0.481 
 
Teaching 
assistant 0.564NS 0.536 Receptionist 0.591 0.551 
 IT user support 0.237
NS 0.735    
 Care assistant 0.296 0.631    
 Accounts clerk 0.189 0.474    
 IT technician 0.273
NS 0.464    
High Accountant 0.336NS 0.938 Software developer 0.592 0.795 
 HR manager 0.048
NS 0.938 Sales representative 0.555 0.739 
Note: Table compares estimated odds ratio of receiving a positive call-back (experiment) with the estimated ethnic penalty in finding a job 
at the appropriate skill level from the UKLFS 2007-2010 and 2014-2017, estimated in logistic regression controlling for gender, age 
(squared), time since leaving education, highest qualifications, being a UK citizen, cohabiting, having a dependent child in the household, 
year of survey and region of residence, weighted to represent the population. The odds ratios for different groups are combined by 
averaging the log odds ratios of each ethnic group coefficient relative to the reference group, thereby ignoring differences in group size 
between the ethnic groups. Odds ratios are statistically significant (p<0.05) unless otherwise indicated (NS). The ethnic penalties are 
estimated by appropriate education level (highest is tertiary qualification; middle has post-secondary qualifications; low indicates at most 
secondary). 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
 
 
Figure 2: Odds ratios of hiring discrimination and corresponding ethnic penalties 
 
Note: the figure  compares estimated odds ratio of receiving a positive call-back (experiment) with the estimated ethnic penalty from  the 
UKLFS 2007-2010 and 2014-2017, estimated in logistic regression controlling for gender, age (squared), time since leaving education, 
highest qualifications, being a UK citizen, cohabiting, having a dependent child in the household, year of survey and region of residence, 
weighted to represent the population (N=447,559 and 541,907 resp.). The 95% confidence interval is shown. The label “Asian” refers to 
other Asian ethnicities, not including Pakistani/Bangladeshi. 
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Figure 3: Ethnic penalties in employment: estimated from survey data and predicted from field 
experiments 
 
Note: The figure shows the estimated ethnic penalty in employment (rather than unemployment) as marginal effects (percentage points) in 
the bars, compared to the ethnic penalties predicted from group-level discrimination rates (markers). Estimated through logistic regression, 
controlling for age (squared), potential experience; highest qualification; whether they are a UK citizen; government office region; whether 
they cohabit; whether a dependent child is present; year of the survey and gender. The figures for 2007-2010 used the Wood experimental 
discrimination and the appropriate sample from the Labour Force Survey; the 2014-2017 figures used the GEMM experimental 
discrimination and the appropriate sample from the UK Labour Force Survey. The label “Asian” refers to other Asian ethnicities, not 
including Pakistani/Bangladeshi. The ethnic penalty for Eastern Europeans in 2014-2017 is 0. 
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Appendix (for online publication) 
Appendix A: Extra tables 
Table A1: estimated discrimination in GEMM experiments  
GEMM replication Positive call-back Invited to (pre-)interview 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.508 0.585 
 (0.372 - 0.693) (0.400 - 0.855) 
Black African 0.448 0.520 
 (0.329 - 0.611) (0.356 - 0.760) 
Eastern Europe 0.606 0.665NS 
 (0.427 - 0.861) (0.433 - 1.022) 
West 0.824 NS 0.775 NS 
 (0.607 - 1.119) (0.528 - 1.138) 
Middle East and North Africa 0.454 0.581 
 (0.312 - 0.660) (0.372 - 0.907) 
Asia 0.678 0.817 NS 
 (0.480 - 0.958) (0.541 - 1.236) 
black Caribbean 0.441 0.569 NS 
 (0.261 - 0.747) (0.304 - 1.067) 
Odds ratio of receiving any positive call-back (1) or being invited to a (pre-) interview, compared to white British majority, 
with 95% confidence interval between brackets. All significant at p<0.05 unless otherwise specified (NS).   
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Table A2a: estimated ethnic penalty and standard error in brackets in employment (p.p.) and 
occupational status (ISEI) using LFS 2007-2010 
 Employment (p.p.) Occupational status 
Black African -0.0688*** -2.438*** 
 (0.00364) (0.564) 
Black Caribbean -0.0527*** -2.038*** 
 (0.00329) (0.393) 
Chinese -0.0198*** 1.780*** 
 (0.00491) (0.573) 
Indian -0.0206*** 2.557*** 
 (0.00222) (0.251) 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi -0.0534*** -1.149*** 
 (0.00264) (0.268) 
 
Table A2b: estimated ethnic penalty and standard error in brackets in employment (p.p.) and 
occupational status (ISEI) using LFS 2014-2017 
 Employment (p.p.) Occupational status 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi -0.0475*** -4.548*** 
 (0.00257) (0.190) 
Black African -0.0663*** -7.621*** 
 (0.00349) (0.235) 
Eastern Europe 0.00436** -8.466*** 
 (0.00215) (0.229) 
Western -0.00861*** 1.121*** 
 (0.00204) (0.167) 
Middle East and North Africa -0.0421*** -3.378*** 
 (0.00586) (0.404) 
Asia -0.0214*** -2.808*** 
 (0.00189) (0.133) 
black Caribbean -0.0369*** -2.945*** 
 (0.00332) (0.262) 
 
Estimated gaps and standard errors compared to white British in employment and in occupational status estimated from 
logistic and OLS regression respectively,  controlling for potential experience, age (squared), highest qualifications, 
citizenship, government office region, cohabiting, dependent child, year of survey, and gender.  
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Appendix B: Estimating ethnic penalties from the UKLFS 
The ethnic penalties are estimated from the UKLFS through logistic regression of being employed 
rather than unemployed. The main independent variable is a set of ethnic dummies with the 
reference category being white British. The ethnic categories differ between the two time-points 
(2007-2010 and 2014-2017). The model further includes several control variables to account for 
background characteristics that may affect employment probability and differ between ethnic groups. 
Potential experience is calculated as the difference between the age at which someone entered the 
labour market and their current age. We also control for age and age squared to allow for non-linear 
effects. We include an indicator variable for having UK citizenship. We include an indicator variable 
for cohabiting with a partner or spouse. We include an indicator variable for having a dependent child 
living in the household. We include an indicator variable for being a woman rather than a man. The 
highest obtained qualification is included through a set of dummies. This variable differs between the 
two timepoints as the LFS changed the reporting of this variable, introducing a more detailed version. 
In the analyses for 2007-2010 qualification is measured through 7 categories (reference: no 
qualifications) while in 2014-2017 16 categories are included. Finally, the models control for the 
government office region (12 categories) and year of survey. Table A3a presents the odds ratios for 
the period 2007-2010 and table A3b shows the results for 2014-2017.  
Table A3a: Ethnic penalties in LFS 2007-2010 
Outcome: Employed Odds ratio Standard error 
Ethnicity (ref. white British)     
Black African 0.401 0.015 
Black Caribbean 0.475 0.017 
Chinese 0.720 0.052 
Indian 0.712 0.023 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.471 0.014 
Potential experience 1.011 0.001 
Age 1.102 0.002 
Age^2 0.999 0.000 
Highest qualification (ref. none)     
Low professional/vocational 1.693 0.030 
GCSE or equivalent 1.973 0.038 
secondary level vocational/technical 2.460 0.051 
A-level or equivalent 3.337 0.082 
Post-secondary non-tertiary 3.053 0.065 
Degree 4.611 0.098 
UK citizenship 1.002 0.023 
Cohabiting 2.836 0.037 
Dependent child 0.759 0.009 
gender (ref = men) 1.304 0.014 
Government office region YES 
Survey year  YES 
N 780,930 
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Table A3b: Ethnic penalties in LFS 2014-2017 
Outcome: Employed Odds ratio Standard error 
Ethnicity (ref. white British)     
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.446 0.015 
Black African 0.357 0.014 
Eastern Europe 1.113 0.062 
West 0.829 0.035 
North African and Middle East 0.480 0.038 
other Asian 0.655 0.021 
Black Caribbean 0.515 0.025 
Potential experience 1.019 0.001 
Age 1.095 0.003 
Age^2 0.999 0.000 
Highest qualification (ref. higher degree)     
NVQ l5 equivalent 0.980 0.165 
first degree 0.791 0.028 
first degree equivalent (NVQ4) 0.911 0.067 
less than college 0.586 0.024 
level 4 0.487 0.159 
NVQ3 0.716 0.030 
A-level or equivalent 0.585 0.023 
AS-level 0.600 0.039 
A-level equivalent 0.478 0.019 
vocational higher secondary 0.317 0.012 
GCSE 0.339 0.012 
NVQ1 0.207 0.009 
basic 0.139 0.023 
Entry 0.329 0.013 
No qualifications 0.167 0.007 
UK citizenship 1.147 0.031 
Cohabiting 2.580 0.043 
Dependent child 0.784 0.012 
gender (ref = men) 1.078 0.015 
Government office region YES 
Survey year YES 
N 556,430 
 
Potential experience is positively related to employment. Employment probability also increases 
with age, but the increase reduces over time. Being a UK citizen is slightly positively associated with 
being employed, but more so in 2014-2017 than in 2007-2010. Those who live with a partner or 
spouse are more likely to be employed, while the presence of dependent children is negatively 
associated with employment. Including all these controls, women are slightly more likely to be 
employed than men. Finally, the probability of employment is higher for the more highly qualified, 
and most so for those with degree qualifications.  
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Appendix C: Robustness tests 
This paper estimates ethnic penalties on a survey sample comparable in time and with similar controls 
to the variables mentioned in the fictitious C.V.s in the field experiments, but the penalties still refer 
to a broader population. As a further test we therefore restrict the samples to closely adhere to the 
fictitious applicants: for the DWP experiment this meant UK nationals aged 35 or under, with GCSE or 
equivalent qualificationsxii, who were either working or had worked at some point in the past; while 
we approach the GEMM sample through including respondents who obtained their highest 
qualifications in the UK, were born in the UK or arrived as a child, had left education at least two and 
at most eight years prior to the survey and had had at least one job. The estimated penalties for this 
risk set are shown in tables A3a and A3b. Although the estimated ethnic penalties on the restricted 
set are less precise, the results are consistent.  
Table A4a: estimated penalty using LFS data (2007-2010) compared to DWP experiments 
DWP replication Discrimination Overall ethnic penalty Risk set 
Black African 0.3 0.401 0.444 
 (0.15-0.61) (0.373 - 0.431) (0.352 - 0.559) 
Black Caribbean 0.269 0.475 0.399 
 (0.124-0.585) (0.442 - 0.510) (0.343 - 0.465) 
Chinese 0.268 0.720 0.722 
 (0.126-0.571) (0.625 - 0.830) (0.497 - 1.049) 
Indian 0.267 0.712 0.662 
 (0.130-0.549) (0.668 - 0.759) (0.577 - 0.760) 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.414 0.471 0.430 
 (0.193-0.889) (0.445 - 0.499) (0.385 - 0.479) 
 
Table A4b: estimated penalty using LFS data (2014-2017) compared to GEMM experiments 
GEMM replication Discrimination Overall ethnic penalty Risk set 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.508 0.446 0.498 
 (0.372 - 0.693) (0.418 - 0.477) (0.444 - 0.559) 
Black African 0.448 0.357 0.292 
 (0.329 - 0.611) (0.331 - 0.386) (0.245 - 0.347) 
Eastern Europe 0.606 1.113 0.994 
 (0.427 - 0.861) (0.999 - 1.241) (0.542 - 1.824) 
Western 0.824 0.829 0.925 
 (0.607 - 1.119) (0.764 - 0.899) (0.760 - 1.126) 
Middle East and North Africa 0.454 0.480 0.597 
 (0.312 - 0.660) (0.410 - 0.560) (0.336 - 1.060) 
Asia 0.678 0.655 0.632 
 (0.480 - 0.958) (0.614 - 0.698) (0.549 - 0.728) 
black Caribbean 0.441 0.515 0.440 
 (0.261 - 0.747) (0.469 - 0.565) (0.370 - 0.523) 
 
Odds ratio and 95% confidence interval of receiving a positive response to application from field experiment 
(Discrimination) and odds ratio of being employed (Ethnic penalty) compared to white British estimated from a logistic 
regression for the overall sample (Overall ethnic penalty) and for the stricter risk set (Risk set), controlling for potential 
experience, age (squared), highest qualifications, citizenship, government office region, cohabiting, dependent child, year of 
survey and gender. 
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We re-estimate the ethnic penalties using a second large dataset: Understanding Society. This is a 
household panel data which includes a substantial ethnic minority boost sample. We use waves from 
2009 to 2017 to re-estimate ethnic penalties using the same control variables as in the UKLFS. 
Standard errors are clustered to account for multiple observations of the same respondent over panel 
waves. We find a comparable hierarchy of ethnic penalties although the outcomes for Chinese and 
overall Asian minorities are even more positive in Understanding Society than in the UKLFS. Results 
are shown in the first column of table A4a and table A4b.  
 
Table A5a: estimated penalty using Understanding Society data compared to Wood et al. (2009) 
 General model (1) Including attitudes (2) 
black African 0.377 0.339 
black Caribbean 0.375 0.344 
Chinese 1.889 NS 1.586 NS 
Indian 0.862 NS 0.881 NS 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.539 0.573 
Observations 124,756 73,000 
 
Table A5b: estimated penalty using Understanding Society data compared to GEMM 
 General model (1) Including attitudes (2) 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.531 0.560 
Black African 0.482 0.483 
Eastern Europe 1.598 1.512 NS 
Western 0.845 NS 0.840 NS 
MENA 0.516 0.467 
Asian 1.001 NS 1.081 NS 
Black Caribbean 0.435 0.421 
Observations 133,036 78,305 
Odds ratio of employed compared to white British estimated from a logistic regression, controlling for potential experience, 
age (squared), highest qualifications, citizenship, government office region, cohabiting, dependent child, year of survey, and 
gender (m1). M2 further includes a measure of traditional gender values, an indicator of English skills, and values for the big 
5 personality scores. Estimates are adjusted for repeated observations of individuals. All significant at p<0.05 unless 
otherwise specified (NS).   
The relation between discrimination rates and ethnic penalties in employment could conceivably be 
driven by a third, unobserved factor which increases the group-level discrimination and reduces the 
probability of being employed, namely cultural values or norms that may deter minorities from 
participating in the labour market (see Koopmans, 2016). This is highly unlikely to drive our results as 
the inactive are not included in our sample, thereby reducing the selection effect. Moreover, 
differences in values would not explain the relatively low ethnic penalties of Eastern European 
minorities, who are often praised for their work ethic, do not originate from culturally distant 
societies, but still encounter strong discrimination in the GEMM experiment. We use Understanding 
Society and include an indicator of English language skills (speaking the language without difficulties, 
having some difficulties, or finding it very difficult to speak English); a score for traditional gender 
norms with values between one and six with six being more traditionalistxiii; and five scores for the 
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Big-Five personality traits. As shown in the second column of table A4a and table A4b, including these 
control variables does not alter the estimated ethnic penalties in any substantial way. It is therefore 
unlikely that the relation between ethnic penalties and hiring discrimination we found is driven by 
norms or values.  
Processes linking ethnic discrimination and ethnic penalties may differ between men and women. 
While a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, we re-estimate the hiring discrimination 
and ethnic penalties separately by gender (results using the GEMM study are shown in table A5 in 
supplementary material). The odds ratios for both hiring discrimination and ethnic penalties are 
generally consistent, but we find indications that hiring discrimination is worse for Asian women than 
men, with no particular differences in ethnic penalties.   
Table A6: estimation and 95% confidence interval of hiring discrimination and ethnic penalty by 
gender, from GEMM and LFS (2014-2017) 
 Men Women 
 Discrimination Ethnic penalty Discrimination Ethnic penalty 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.445 0.516 0.563 0.328 
 (0.283 - 0.700) (0.471 - 0.565) (0.366 - 0.866) (0.297 - 0.362) 
Black African 0.457 0.342 0.431 0.379 
 (0.297 - 0.705) (0.304 - 0.385) (0.277 - 0.672) (0.340 - 0.421) 
Eastern Europe 0.590 1.523 0.597 0.876 
 (0.351 - 0.991) (1.283 - 1.809) (0.370 - 0.964) (0.760 - 1.009) 
Western 0.764 0.783 0.881 0.891 
 (0.484 - 1.205) (0.698 - 0.879) (0.581 - 1.337) (0.793 - 1.002) 
MENA 0.505 0.494 0.402 0.398 
 (0.300 - 0.852) (0.405 - 0.603) (0.234 - 0.690) (0.309 - 0.512) 
Asian 0.929 0.703 0.479 0.614 
 (0.581 - 1.484) (0.640 - 0.773) (0.285 - 0.803) (0.563 - 0.670) 
Black Caribbean 0.551 0.383 0.363 0.683 
 (0.250 - 1.211) (0.336 - 0.437) (0.178 - 0.737) (0.597 - 0.781) 
Observations 1,694 285,563 1,553 270,867 
Odds ratio of receiving a positive response to application from GEMM field experiment (Discrimination) and odds ratioof 
being employed (Ethnic penalty) compared to white British estimated from a logistic regression, controlling for potential 
experience, age (squared), highest qualifications, citizenship, government office region, cohabiting, dependent child, year of 
survey, separately by gender 
 
 
xii We considered GCSE’s, O-levels, CSE qualifications, or advanced higher, equivalent. 
xiii The score is the average of four questions, namely whether a pre-school child suffers if the mother works; whether a 
family suffers if the mother works full-time; whether a husband and wife should both contribute to the household income; 
and whether the husband should earn while the wife stays at home. The scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.99 indicating 
very high reliability.  
 
